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Abstract. In proof theory, a standard method for showing the correct-
ness of a program w.r.t. given pre- and postconditions is to construct
a weakest precondition and to show that the precondition implies the
weakest precondition. In this paper, graph programs in the sense of Ha-
bel and Plump 2001 are extended to programs over high-level rules with
application conditions, a formal definition of weakest preconditions for
high-level programs in the sense of Dijkstra 1975 is given, and a con-
struction of weakest preconditions is presented.
1 Introduction
Graphs and related structures are associated with an accessible graphical rep-
resentation. Transformation rules exploit this advantage, as they describe local
change by relating a left- and a right-hand side. Nondeterministic choice, se-
quential composition and iteration give rise to rule-based programs [19].
Formal methods like verification with respect to a formal specification are im-
portant for the development of trustworthy systems. We use a graphical notion of
conditions to specify valid objects as well as morphisms, e.g. matches for trans-
formation rules. We distinguish the use of conditions by speaking of constraints
in the first case, and application conditions for rules in the latter. Conditions
seem to be adequate for describing requirements as well as for reasoning about
the behavior of a system.
A well-known method for showing the correctness of a program with respect to
a pre- and a postcondition (see e.g. [7,8]) is to construct a weakest precondition
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of the program relative to the postcondition and to prove that the precondition
implies the weakest precondition.
In this paper, we use the framework of weak adhesive HLR categories to
construct weakest preconditions for high-level rules and programs, using two
known transformations from constraints to right application conditions, and from
right to left application conditions, and additionally, a new transformation from
application conditions to constraints.
left appl cond right appl cond
constraint constraint
precondition postcondition
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, high-level conditions, rules and
programs are defined and an access control for computer systems is introduced as
a running example. In Section 3, two basic transformations of [16] are reviewed
and, additionally, an essential transformation from application conditions into
constraints is presented. In Section 4, weakest preconditions for high-level pro-
grams are formally defined and a transformation of programs and postconditions
into weakest preconditions is given. In Section 5, related concepts and results
are discussed. A conclusion including further work is given in Section 6. A long
version of this paper including properties of weakest preconditions and detailed
proofs of some results is available as a technical report [18].
2 Conditions and Programs
In this section, we will review the definitions of conditions, rules, and programs
for high-level structures, e.g. graphs. We use the framework of weak adhesive
HLR categories introduced as combination of HLR systems and adhesive cate-
gories. A detail introduction introduction can be found in [14,15]. As a running
example, we consider a simple graph transformation system consisting of rules
and programs. We demonstrate that programs are necessary extensions of rules
for certain tasks and conditions can be used to describe a wide range of system
properties, e.g. security properties.
Assumption. We assume that 〈C,M〉 is a weak adhesive HLR category with
a category C, a class M of monomorphisms, a M-initial object, i.e. an object I
in C such that there exists a unique morphism I → G in M for every object G
in C; binary coproducts and epi-M-factorization, i.e. for every morphism there
is an epi-mono-factorization with monomorphism in M.
For illustration, we consider the category Graph of all directed, labeled graphs,
which together with the class M of all injective graph morphisms constitutes
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a weak adhesive HLR category with binary coproducts and epi-M-factorization
and the empty graph ∅ as the M-initial object.
Example 1 (access control graphs). In the following, we introduce state graphs of
a simple access control for computer systems, which abstracts authentication and
models user and session management in a simple way. We use this example solely
for illustrative purposes. A more elaborated, role-based access control model is
considered in [22]. The basic items of our model are users , sessions , logs ,
computer systems , and directed edges between those items. An edge between
a user and a system represents that the user has the right to access the system,
i.e. establish a session with the system. Every user node is connected with one
log, while an edge from a log to the system represents a failed (logged) login
attempt. Every session is connected to a user and a system. The direction of the
latter edge differentiates between sessions that have been proposed (an outgoing
edge from a session node to a system) and sessions that have been established (an
incoming edge to a session node from a system). Self-loops may occur in graphs
during the execution of programs to select certain elements, but not beyond. An
example of an access control graph is given in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. A state graph of the access control system
Conditions are nested constraints and application conditions in the sense of [16]
generalizing the corresponding notions in [13] along the lines of [30].
Definition 1 (conditions). A condition over an object P is of the form ∃a or
∃(a, c), where a:P → C is a morphism and c is a condition over C. Moreover,
Boolean formulas over conditions [over P ] are conditions [over P ]. Additionally,
∀(a, c) abbreviates ¬∃(a,¬c). A morphism p:P → G satisfies a condition ∃a
[∃(a, c)] over P if there exists a morphism q:C → G in M with q ◦ a = p
[satisfying c]. An object G satisfies a condition ∃a [∃(a, c)] if all morphisms
p:P → G in M satisfy the condition. The satisfaction of conditions [over P ]
by objects [by morphisms with domain P ] is extended onto Boolean conditions
[over P ] in the usual way. We write p |= c [G |= c] to denote that morphism p
[object G] satisfies c. Two conditions c and c′ over P are equivalent on objects,
denoted by c ≡ c′, if, for all objects G, G |= c if and only if G |= c′.
We allow infinite conjunctions and disjunctions of conditions. In the context of
objects, conditions are also called constraints, in the context of rules, they are
called application conditions. As the required morphisms of the semantics are to
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be in M, we sometimes speak of M-satisfiability as opposed to A-satisfiability,
where A is the class of all morphisms (see [17]).
Notation. For a morphism a:P → C in a condition, we just depict C, if P can
be unambiguously inferred, i.e. for conditions over some left- or right-hand side
and for constraints over the M-initial object I. Note, that for every constraint
over P , there is an equivalent constraint over I, i.e. d ≡ ∀(I → P, d), for d = ∃a
or ∃(a, c) (see [18]).
Example 2 (access control conditions). Consider the access control graphs intro-
duced in Example 1. Conditions allow to formulate statements on the graphs of
the access control and can be combined to form more complex statements. The
following conditions are over the empty graph:
∃( ) A user is logged into a system.
∃( ) A user has an access right to a system.
∃( ) A user is connected with a log.
¬∃( ) There are not more than three failed, logged
login attempts for any system and any user.
∃( ) A session is proposed.
∀( , ∃( ) ∨ ∃( )) Every session is either established or proposed.
∀( , ∃( )) Every user is connected with a log.
∀( , ∃( )) Every user that is logged into a system, has an
access right.
Fig. 2. Conditions on access control graphs
We consider rules with application conditions [13,16]. Examples and pointers to
the literature can be found in [11,6].
Definition 2 (rules). A plain rule p = 〈L ← K → R〉 consists of two mor-
phisms in M with a common domain K. L is called the left-hand side, R the
right-hand side, and K the interface. An application condition ac = 〈acL, acR〉
for p consists of two application conditions over L and R, respectively. A rule
pˆ = 〈p, ac〉 consists of a plain rule p and an application condition ac for p.
L K R
G D H
m m∗(1) (2)
Given a plain rule p and a morphism K → D, a direct derivation consists of
two pushouts (1) and (2). We write G ⇒p,m,m∗ H , G ⇒p H , or short G ⇒ H
and say that m is the match and m∗ is the comatch of p in H . Given a rule
Weakest Preconditions for High-Level Programs 449
pˆ = 〈p, ac〉 and a morphism K → D, there is a direct derivation G ⇒pˆ,m,m∗ H if
G ⇒p,m,m∗ H , m |= acL, and m∗ |= acR. Let A be the class of all morphisms in
C. We distinguish between A-matching, i.e. the general case, and M-matching,
i.e. if the match and the comatch are required to be in M.
Notation. For the category Graph, we write 〈L ⇒ R〉 to abbreviate the rule
〈L ← K → R〉, where K consists of all nodes common to L and R.
Example 3 (access control rules). Consider the access control graphs introduced
in Example 1. The rules in Figure 3 are used to formalize the dynamic behavior
of the access control system, i.e. are the basis of the access control programs.
Note, for every rule, every match is in M. AddUser is a plain rule to introduce
a user (and the associated log) to the system. Grant is a rule with application
AddUser : 〈∅ ⇒ 〉
Grant : 〈〈 ⇒ 〉, 〈¬∃( ), true〉〉
Login : 〈 ⇒ 〉
Logout1 : 〈 ⇒ 〉
Logout2 : 〈 ⇒ 〉
SelectS : 〈 ⇒ 〉
AccessS : 〈 ⇒ 〉
LogS : 〈 ⇒ 〉
ClearLogS : 〈ClearLog, 〈∃( ), true〉〉
ClearLog : 〈 ⇒ 〉
DeselectS : 〈 ⇒ 〉
SelectUS : 〈 ⇒ 〉
LogoutUS1 : 〈Logout1, 〈∃( ), true〉〉
LogoutUS2 : 〈Logout2, 〈∃( ), true〉〉
RevokeUS : 〈Revoke, 〈∃( ), true〉〉
Revoke : 〈 ⇒ 〉
DeselectUS : 〈 ⇒ 〉
SelectU : 〈 ⇒ 〉
LogoutU1 : 〈Logout1, 〈∃( ), true〉〉
LogoutU2 : 〈Logout2, 〈∃( ), true〉〉
RevokeU 〈Revoke, 〈∃( ), true〉〉
ClearLogU : 〈ClearLog, 〈∃( ), true〉〉
DeleteU : 〈 ⇒ ∅〉
Fig. 3. Rules of the access control system
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conditions: It grants a user the right to access a system, unless the user already
has access. Login models a user proposing a session to a system, while Logout1
and Logout2 cancel an established or a proposed session, respectively. Rules
with suffix S, US and U concern selected sessions (S), user and systems (US) and
user (U) and are combined to programs in Figure 4. A description of each rule
is given in [18].
We generalize the notions of programs on linear structures [7,8] and graph pro-
grams [19,27]) to high-level programs on rules.
Definition 3 (programs). (High-level) Programs are inductively defined:
(1) Skip and every rule p are programs.
(2) Every finite set S of programs is a program.
(3) Given programs P and Q, then (P ;Q), P ∗ and P↓ are programs.
The semantics of a program P is a binary relation P  ⊆ C ×C on objects which
is inductively defined as follows:
(1) Skip = {〈G,G〉 | G ∈ C} and for every rule p, p = {〈G,H〉 | G ⇒p H}.
(2) For a finite set S of programs, S = ∪P∈SP .
(3) For programs P and Q, (P ;Q) = Q ◦ P , P ∗ = P ∗ and
P↓ = {〈G,H〉 | 〈G,H〉 ∈ P ∗ and ¬∃M. 〈H,M〉 ∈ P }.
Programs according to (1) are elementary; a program according (2) describes
the nondeterministic choice of a program; a program (P ;Q) is the sequential
composition of P and Q, P ∗ is the reflexive, transitive closure of P , and P↓ is
the iteration of P as long as possible.
Example 4 (access control programs). Consider the access control graphs in Ex-
ample 1. The dynamic part of the control system Control∗ is the reflexive,
transitive closure of the programs Control = {AddUser, Grant, Login, Logout,
ProcessLogin, Revoke, DeleteUser}, depicted in Figure 3 and Figure 4, respec-
tively. Logout cancels a session (established or proposed). ProcessLogin models
Logout = {Logout1, Logout2}
ProcessLogin = SelectS; AccessS↓; LogS↓; ClearLogS↓; DeselectS↓
Revoke = SelectUS; LogoutUS↓; RevokeUS; DeselectUS
LogoutU = {LogoutU1, LogoutU2}
DeleteUser = SelectU; LogoutU↓; RevokeU↓; ClearLogU↓; DeleteU
Fig. 4. Programs of the access control system
the reaction of a system towards a session proposal, which, dependent on the
user’s right, leads to an established session and the clearing of the user’s log of
failed attempts, or the denial and removal of that session and the logging of the
failed attempt. Revoke removes a user’s right to access a system, but not be-
fore closing the user’s sessions to that system. Finally, DeleteUser is a program
to delete a user and his/her associated log by canceling the user’s sessions, by
removing the user’s access rights and by clearing the user’s log.
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Note, that there is no way to model certain actions like DeleteUser by a single
rule, as a user, in principle, may have an arbitrary number of sessions or log
entries. However, user deletion should be a transaction always applicable for
every user.
Definition 4 (termination). A program P applied to an input object G ter-
minates properly, if PDer(P,G) is finite, i.e. ∃k ∈ N. |PDer(P,G)| ≤ k, where
PDer(P,G) denotes the set of all partial derivations within the execution of a
program P , starting with G (see [18]).
Remark 1. Execution of high-level programs requires backtracking, therefore the
above definition of termination is more suitable than the classical one, i.e. the
nonexistence of infinite derivations. This may be seen as follows: An infinite
derivation implies infinitely many partial derivations. The other direction holds
only if the number of matches is finite. By the uniqueness of pushouts, PDer(p,G)
is finite and there cannot be infinitely many derivations of finite length for any
program P .
3 Basic Transformations of Conditions
In the following, we recall two known transformations from constraints to ap-
plication conditions and from right- to left application conditions [21,13,16] and
present a new transformation from application conditions to constraints. Com-
bining these basic transformations, we obtain a transformation from a post-
condition over the rule to a precondition. First, there is a transformation from
constraints to application conditions such that a morphism satisfies the applica-
tion condition if and only if the codomain satisfies the constraint.
Theorem 1 (transformation of constraints into application conditions).
There is a transformation A such that, for every constraint c and every rule
p = 〈L ← K → R〉, and all morphisms m∗:R → H, m∗ |= A(p, c) ⇔ H |= c.
Second, there is a transformation from right to left application conditions such
that a comatch satisfies an application condition if and only if the match satisfies
the transformed application condition.
Theorem 2 (transformation of application conditions). There is a trans-
formation L such that, for every rule p, every right application condition ac for
p, and all direct derivations G ⇒p,m,m∗ H, m |= L(p, ac) ⇔ m∗ |= ac.
We consider a transformation of application conditions to constraints, which
correspond to the universal closure of application conditions. For A-matching
however, the closure is over arbitrary morphisms and does not fit to the notion
of M-satisfiability. This is why a part of the application condition has to be
transformed accordingly.
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Theorem 3 (transformation of application conditions into constraints).
For weak adhesive HLR categories with M-initial object, there is a transforma-
tion C such that, for every application condition ac over L and for all objects G,
G |= C(ac) ⇔ ∀m:L → G. m |= ac
Construction. Define C(ac) =
∧
e∈E ∀(e◦i, Ce(ac)) where the junction ranges
over all epimorphisms e:L → L′ and i: I → L is the unique morphism from
the M-initial object to L. The transformation Ce is defined inductively on the
structure of the conditions: Ce(∃a) = ∃a′ and Ce(∃(a, c)) = ∃(a′, c) if a = a′ ◦ e
is some epi-M-factorization of a and Ce(∃a) = Ce(∃(a, c)) = false if there is
no epi-M-factorization of a with epimorphism e. For Boolean conditions, the
transformation Ce is extended in the usual way.
Example 5. The application condition ac = ¬∃( )∧¬∃( )∧¬∃( )
over expresses that there is no edge between two given session nodes.
C(ac) = ∀( , Cid(ac)) ∧ ∀( , Ce(ac))
= ∀( , ¬Cid(∃( )) ∧ ¬Cid(∃( )) ∧ ¬Cid(∃( )))
∧ ∀( , ¬Ce(∃( )) ∧ ¬Ce(∃( )) ∧ ¬Ce(∃( )))
= ∀( , ac) ∧ ∀( , ¬false ∧ ¬false ∧ ¬∃( ))
≡ ∀( , ¬∃( ) ∧ ¬∃( ) ∧ true) ∧ ∀( , true ∧ ¬∃( ))
≡ ∀( , ¬∃( ) ∧ ¬∃( )) ∧ ∀( , ¬∃( ))
with id: → and e: → .
Proof. In [17] is shown: For all m′:L′ → G in M and all epimorphisms e:L → L′,
m′ |= Ce(ac′) ⇔ m′ ◦ e |= ac′ (∗)
We show: ∀m:L → G, m |= ac if and only if G |= C(ac). “Only if”. Assume
∀m:L → G, m |= ac. For G |= C(ac) to hold, G has to satisfy Ce(ac) for all
epimorphisms e:L → L′, i.e. for all epimorphisms e:L → L′ and all morphisms
m′:L′ → G in M holds m′ |= Ce(ac). Given such morphisms e and m′, define
m = m′ ◦ e. By assumption, m |= ac, and by (∗) we have m′ |= Ce(ac), hence
G |= C(ac). “If”. Assume G |= C(ac), i.e. G satisfies Ce(ac) for all epimorphisms
e:L → L′, i.e. for all epimorphisms e:L → L′ and all morphisms m′:L′ → G in
M holds m′ |= Ce(ac). Given an arbitrary morphism m:L → G, consider the epi-
M-factorization m′◦e. By assumption, m′ |= Ce(ac), and by (∗) we have m |= ac.
Remark 2. The uniqueness of epi-M-factorizations (up to isomorphism) fol-
lows immediately from the uniqueness of epi-mono-factorizations, as every M-
morphism is a monomorphism.
Remark 3. For weak adhesive HLR categories with M-initial object and M-
matching, there is a simplified transformation C such that, for every application
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condition ac over L and for all objects G, G |= C(ac)⇔∀m:L→G∈M. m |= ac.
For an application condition ac over L and i: I → L, let C(ac) = ∀(i, ac). For
all M-morphisms m:L → G, m |= ac iff there exists an M-morphism p: I → G
such that for all M-morphisms m:L → G holds m |= ac iff there exists an M-
morphism p: I → G such that for all M-morphisms m:L → G with p = m ◦ i
holds m |= ac iff G |= ∀(i, ac) (Def.1).
Finally, the applicability of a rule can be expressed by a left application condition
for the matching morphism.
Theorem 4 (applicability of a rule). There is a transformation Def from
rules into application conditions such that, for every rule p and every morphism
m:L → G,
m |= Def(p) ⇔ ∃H.G ⇒p,m,m∗ H.
Construction. For a rule p = 〈q, ac〉, let Def(p) = Appl(q) ∧ acL ∧ L(p, acR),
where, for a rule q = 〈L ←l K →r R〉, Appl(q) = ∧a∈A¬∃a and the index set A
ranges over all morphisms a:L → L′ such that the pair 〈l, a〉 has no pushout
complement and there is no decomposition a = a′′◦a′ of a with proper morphism
a′′ in M (a′′ not an isomorphism) such that 〈l, a′〉 has no pushout complement.
Example 6. An example of Appl is given below for DeleteSys = 〈 ← ∅ → ∅〉.
Intuitively, the application of DeleteSys requires the absence of additional edges
adjacent to the system node. Therefore, DeleteSys may only be the last step in
program deleting a system node. Appl(DeleteSys) is a condition over .
Appl(DeleteSys) = ¬∃( ) ∧ ¬∃( ) ∧ ¬∃( ) ∧ ¬∃( )
∧ ¬∃( ) ∧ ¬∃( ) ∧ ¬∃( ) ∧ ¬∃( )
∧ ¬∃( )
Proof. For plain rules, we show that, for every morphism m:L → G,
m |= Appl(q) ⇔ ∃H.G ⇒q,m,m∗ H.
“Only if” Let m |= Appl(q). Assume there is no direct derivation G ⇒q,m,m∗ H .
Then the pair 〈l,m〉 has no pushout complement and there is a morphism a:L →
L′ such that 〈l, a〉 has no pushout complement and m |= ∃a. Then m |= Appl(q).
A contradiction. Consequently, there is a direct derivation G ⇒q,m,m∗ H .
“If” Let G ⇒q,m,m∗ H . Then, for every morphism a:L →
L′, m |= ∃a iff there is some m′:L′ → G in M such that
m′ ◦ a = m. By the pushout-pullback decomposition, the
pushout has a decomposition into two pushouts (1) and
(2) and, in particular, 〈l, a〉 has a pushout complement.
Consequently, for every morphism a ∈ A, m |= ¬∃a, i.e.
m |= Appl(q).
L K
L′ K ′
G D
l
m
(1)
(2)
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By the definition of Def and |=, Theorem 4, the statement above, and the def-
inition of ⇒, for every morphism m:L → G, m |= Def(p) iff m |= Appl(q) ∧
m |= acL ∧ m |= L(p, acR) iff ∃H.G ⇒q,m,m∗ H ∧ m |= acL ∧ m∗ |= acR iff
∃H.G ⇒p,m,m∗ H . This completes the proof.
4 Weakest Preconditions
In the following, we define weakest preconditions for high-level programs sim-
ilar to the ones for Dijkstra’s guarded commands in [7,8], show how to con-
struct weakest preconditions for high-level programs and demonstrate the use
of weakest preconditions to reduce problems on programs, e.g. the invariance of
conditions, onto tautology problems of conditions.
Definition 5 (weakest preconditions). For a program P relative to a condi-
tion d we define: A condition c is a precondition, if for all objects G satisfying c,
(1) 〈G,H〉 ∈ P  implies H |= d for all H , (2) 〈G,H〉 ∈ P  for some H , and
(3) P terminates for G. A precondition c is a weakest precondition, denoted by
wp(P, d), if for all other preconditions c′ of P relative to d, c′ implies c. A condi-
tion c is a liberal precondition, if for all objects G |= c at least (1) is satisfied, and
a weakest liberal precondition, denoted by wlp(P, d), if all other liberal precondi-
tions c′ of P relative to d imply c. A condition c is a termination precondition,
if for all objects G |= c properties (1) and (3) are satisfied, and a weakest termi-
nation precondition, denoted by wtp(P, d), if all other termination preconditions
c′ of P relative to d imply c.
The following fact points out a simple proof scheme for weakest preconditions.
Fact 1 (weakest preconditions). A condition c is a weakest precondition if,
for all objects G, G |= c if and only if properties (1)-(3) are satisfied.
For the construction of weakest preconditions, we make use of the fact that
wp(P, d) is a conjunction of three properties and treat properties (1) and (3),
and property (2) separately. We observe property (2) is equivalent to the negation
of property (1) for d = ¬true, hence we state:
Fact 2 (existence of results). G |= ¬wlp(P, false) ⇔ property (2) is satisfied.
Assumption. We assume that 〈C,M〉 is a weak adhesive HLR category with
finite number of matches, i.e. for every morphism l:K → L and every object G,
there exist only a finite number of morphisms m:L → G s.t. 〈l,m〉 has a pushout
complement.
Theorem 5 (weakest preconditions). For weak adhesive HLR categories
with finite number of matches, there are transformations Wlp, Wtp and Wp such
that for every program P and every condition d, Wlp(P, d) is a weakest liberal
precondition, Wtp(P, d) is a weakest termination precondition and Wp(P, d) is
a weakest precondition of P relative to d.
Construction. The transformations are defined inductively over the structure
of programs. For every rule p, let
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Wlp(p, d) = Wtp(p, d) = C(Def(p) ⇒ L(p,A(p, d))).
For any program P , Wp(P, d) = Wtp(P, d) ∧ ¬Wlp(P, false).
For any set S of programs and programs P,Q,
Wlp(Skip, d) = d
Wlp(S, d) = ∧P∈S Wlp(P, d)
Wlp((P ;Q), d) = Wlp(P,Wlp(Q, d))
Wlp(P ∗, d) =
∧∞
i=0 Wlp(P
i, d)
Wlp(P↓, d) = Wlp(P ∗,Wlp(P, false) ⇒ d)
Wtp(Skip, d) = d
Wtp(S, d) = ∧P∈S Wtp(P, d)
Wtp((P ;Q), d) = Wtp(P,Wtp(Q, d))
Wtp(P ∗, d) =
∧∞
i=0 Wlp(P
i, d ∧ Wtp(P, true)) ∧ ∨∞k=0 Wlp(P k+1, false)
Wtp(P↓, d) = Wtp(P ∗,Wlp(P, false) ⇒ d)
where for i ≥ 0, P i is inductively defined by Skip for i = 0 and by P i+1=(P i;P ).
Proof. We show Wlp(P, d) ≡ wlp(P, d), Wtp(P, d) ≡ wtp(P, d), and Wp(P, d) ≡
wp(P, d). The first two proofs are done by induction over the structure of pro-
grams. First we consider elementary programs consisting of a single rule p. For
all objects G, we have:
G |= Wlp(p, d)
⇔ G |= C(Def(p) ⇒ L(p,A(p, d))) (Def. Wlp)
⇔ ∀L m→G. m |= (Def(p) ⇒ L(p,A(p, d))) (Thm. 3)
⇔ ∀L m→G. m |= Def(p) ⇒ m |= L(p,A(p, d)) (Def. |=)
⇔ ∀L m→G,R m
∗
→ H. m |= Def(p) ⇒ m∗ |= A(p, d) (Thm. 2)
⇔ ∀L m→G,R m∗→ H. (G ⇒p,m,m∗ H) ⇒ H |= d (Thms. 4 & 1)
⇔ ∀H. 〈G,H〉 ∈ p ⇒ H |= d (Def. p)
⇔ G |= wlp(p, d) (Def. wlp)
Thus, Wlp(p, d) is a weakest liberal precondition of p relative to d. Furthermore,
G |= Wtp(p, d) if and only if G |= Wlp(p, d), as every rule application terminates
by the finiteness assumption and wtp reduces to wlp for single rules p. For
composed programs, the statement follows by structural induction (see [18].)
For Wp, we now show for every program P , Wp(P, d) ≡ wp(P, d): Wp(P, d) is
defined as ¬Wlp(P, false)∧Wtp(P, d), which is, by the first two equations, equiv-
alent to ¬wlp(P, false) ∧ wtp(P, d), which is equivalent to wp(P, d) (see [18].)
Example 7 (access control system). Consider the access control for computer
systems, presented in Examples 1-4. For the system, one might want to ensure
the validity of certain properties, e.g.:
(1) Always, every user logged into a system, has an access right to the system:
secure implies wlp(Control, secure), where
secure = ∀( , ∃( )).
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(2) Every user can always be deleted: ∃( ) implies wp(DeleteUser, true)
(3) Every user can always have his access right to a system revoked:
∃( ) implies wp(Revoke, true)
By calculating weakest [liberal] preconditions, the problem to decide these prop-
erties can be reduced onto the tautology problem for conditions. The meaning
of secure implies wlp(Control, secure) can be seen as follows: The constraint
secure is an invariant, i.e. given a state satisfying secure, every next state will
also satisfy secure. For a proof, we have to show secure implies Wlp(P, secure)
for every program P ∈ Control.
We give explicit proof of property (1) for the programs AddUser and Grant.
For the program AddUser, secure implies Wlp(AddUser, secure), which can be
proved as follows:
A(AddUser, secure) = ∀( , ∃( ))
∧ ∀( , ∃( ))
L(AddUser,A(AddUser, secure)) = ∀( , ∃( )) = secure
Wlp(AddUser, secure) = C(Def(AddUser) ⇒ L(AddUser,A(AddUser, secure)))
= C((Appl(AddUser) ∧ true ∧ true) ⇒ secure)
≡ C(true ⇒ secure) ≡ C(secure)
= ∀(∅, secure)
≡ secure
This is no surprise as we could also have argued that a newly added user cannot
have an established session with a system, hence every application of AddUser
preserves the satisfaction of secure. For the program Grant, secure implies
Wlp(Grant, secure), even without the additional application condition.
L(Grant,A(Grant, secure))
= ∀( , ∃( ))
∧ ∀( , ∃( ))
∧ ∀( , ∃( ))
∧ ∀( , ∃( ))
Wlp(Grant, secure)
= C(Def(Grant) ⇒ L(Grant,A(Grant, secure)))
= C((Appl(Grant) ∧ ¬∃( ) ∧ true) ⇒ L(Grant,A(Grant, secure)))
≡ C(¬∃( ) ⇒ L(Grant,A(Grant, secure)))
if C(L(Grant,A(Grant, secure)))
if L(Grant,A(Grant, secure))
Note, secure implies L(Grant,A(Grant, secure)) and thus Wlp(Grant, secure).
We also have secure implies Wlp(Login, secure), the proof of which is similar to
secure implies Wlp(Grant, secure), as L(Grant, A(Grant, secure)) ≡ L(Login,
A(Login, secure)).
For Logout, ProcessLogin, Revoke and DeleteUser, we shall only sketch the
proofs. It is easy to see that Logout1 as well as Logout2 preserve the satisfaction
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of secure, hence we can assume secure implies Wlp(Logout, secure). Concerning
ProcessLogin, one can prove the invariance of secure for every used rule, i.e.
SelectS, AccessS, LogS, ClearLogS and DeselectS, and moreover, for every
subprogram of ProcessLogin. Intuitively the only interesting part is the proof
of secure implies Wlp(AccessS, secure), while the validity of this claim is quite
obvious. Concerning Revoke, one can show that LogoutUS↓ leaves no sessions
for any selected user and system (see property (4)). As a consequence, RevokeUS
will preserve the satisfaction of secure, as do all other parts of Revoke, hence
secure implies Wlp(Revoke, secure). The proof of DeleteUser is similar.
(4) After execution of LogoutUS↓, there is no established session left for any
selected user and system: wlp(LogoutUS↓,¬∃( )) ≡ true.
(5) C(Appl(Logout1))∧C(Appl(Logout2)) is an invariant for all programs P in
Control, and all subprograms and rules of Revoke and DeleteUser.
One can show property (4) by using (5) as one observesWlp(LogoutUS↓, secure) ≡
Wlp(LogoutU∗, true) ≡ true. Property (5) expresses that certain edges adjacent
to a session node do not exist, while others have a multiplicity of at most 1.
Proving property (5) for all rules used in Control is tedious, but nonetheless
straightforward, as every subcondition may handled separately. Intuitively only
subprograms and rules have to be considered that contain a session node, and
moreover, that create or delete edges adjacent to session nodes.
5 Related Concepts
In this section we briefly review other work on using graph transformation for
verification. Before we do so, however, we wish to point out one important global
difference between this related work and the approach of this paper.
– The approach of this paper is based on the principle of assertional reasoning,
and inherits both the advantage and the disadvantage of that principle. The
advantage is that the approach is general where it can be made to apply,
meaning that it provides a method to verify finite-state and infinite-state
systems alike. The disadvantage is that finding invariants is hard and cannot
be automated in general.
– Existing approaches are typically based on the principle of model check-
ing, which essentially involves exhaustive exploration, either of the concrete
states (which are often too numerous to cover completely) or on some level of
abstraction (in which case the results become either unsound or incomplete).
On the positive side, model checking is a push-button approach, meaning
that it requires no human intervention.
In other words, there is a dividing line between the work in this paper and the
related work reported below, which is parallel to the division between theorem
proving and model checking in “mainstream” verification (see [20] for an early
discussion). Since current wisdom holds that these approaches can actually be
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combined to join strengths (e.g., [5,25]), we expect that the same will turn out
to hold in the context of graph transformation.
The first paper in which it was put forward that graph transformation sys-
tems can serve as a suitable specification formalism on the basis of which model
checking can be performed was Varro´ [32]; this was followed up by [33] which
describes a tool chain by which graph transformation systems are translated
to Promela, and then model checked by SPIN. We pursued a similar approach
independently in [28,29], though relying on dedicated (graph transformation-
based) state space generation rather than an existing tool. The two strands were
compared in [31]. Again independently, Dotti et al. [10,9] also describe a transla-
tion from a graph transformation-based specification formalism (which they call
object-based graph grammars) to Promela.
Another model checking-related approach, based on the idea of McMillan un-
foldings for Petri Nets (see [24]), has been pursued by Baldan, Ko¨nig et al.
in, e.g., [2,1], and in combination with abstraction in [3,23]. The latter avoids
the generation of complete (concrete) state spaces, at the price of being ap-
proximative, in other words, admitting either false positives (unsoundness) or
false negatives (incompleteness) in the analysis. The (pure) model checking and
abstraction-based techniques were briefly compared in [4].
Termination. In addition to the general verification methods discussed above, a
lot of research has been carried out on more specific properties of graph gram-
mars. Especially relevant in our context is the work on termination of graph
grammars. This is known to be undecidable in general (see [26]), but under spe-
cial circumstances may be shown to hold; for instance, Ehrig et al. discuss such
a special case for model transformation in [12].
6 Conclusion
This paper extends graph programs to programs over high-level rules with ap-
plication conditions, and defines weakest preconditions over high-level programs
similar to the ones for Dijkstra’s guarded commands in [7,8]. It presents trans-
formations from application conditions to constraints, which, combined with two
known transformations over constraints and application conditions, can be used
to construct weakest preconditions for high-level rules as well as programs.
A known proof technique for showing the correctness of a programwith respect
to a pre- and a postcondition is to construct a weakest precondition and to show
that the precondition implies the weakest precondition. We demonstrate the
applicability of this method on our access control for computer systems.
Further topics could be the followings.
(1) Consideration of strongest postconditions.
(2) Comparison of notions: A comparison of conditions – as considered in this
paper – and first-order formulas on graphs and high-level structures.
(3) Generalization of notions: The generalization of conditions to capture mona-
dic second order properties.
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(4) An investigation of the tautology problem for conditions with the aim to
find a suitable class of conditions, for which the problem is decidable.
(5) Implementation: A system for computing/approximating weakest precondi-
tions and for deciding/semideciding correctness of program specifications.
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